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RETOOLING GENERAL MOTORS: 
DEFENDING AN INNOVATIVE USE OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE TO SAVE AMERICA’S 
AUTO INDUSTRY 
Joseph H. Smolinsky* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man 
stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit 
belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust 
and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again 
and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming[.] 
President Theodore Roosevelt 1 
The “bailout” of General Motors Corporation (GM) has been criticized 
in many circles as the pursuit of a socialist agenda, the perpetuation of an 
ongoing problem of moral hazard, or simply an example of a bad business 
blunder that would never be replicated in the private sector. But, as this 
Article will point out, it was none of those things. 
The significance of GM to the U.S. economy cannot be overstated. 
Liquidation would have meant almost certain devastation to many segments 
of the economy. Economists, with the benefit of hindsight, have confirmed 
the obvious: the cost of the restructuring to taxpayers has been fairly 
modest when compared to the alternative of inaction. And with the help of 
more stable capital markets, the newly created General Motors Company is 
now back in public hands, beyond the need for taxpayer support. 
Aside from the direct economic ramifications at stake, the failure of 
GM—perhaps the most iconic representation of American manufacturing—
could have destroyed the national psyche and consumer confidence at a 
critical time in the 2008–2009 financial crisis. A government takeover of 
GM in the traditional sense could have been equally damaging. Therefore, 
the manner in which the U.S. government stepped in was equally important 
to the decision to do so. 
The rescue of GM and Chrysler LLC (Chrysler) was most stunning in 
its use of traditional Chapter 11 procedures. There was no seizing of assets 
by the U.S. government under principles of nationalization or eminent 
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 1. President Theodore Roosevelt, Address at the Sorbonne in Paris, France, The Man in the 
Arena: Citizenship in a Republic (Apr. 23, 1910). 
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domain. There was no bailout involving direct payments to creditors or 
financial grants typically associated with creating moral hazard. Despite the 
media frenzy and public outcry from parochial interests claiming cronyism 
and backroom politics, the auto restructurings were very much like the 
routine Chapter 11 cases that insolvency professionals handle on a daily 
basis. Ultimately, the parties involved conducted the sale transactions at the 
center of the restructurings with the utmost transparency and afforded all 
possible and available due process to affected parties. 
It is certainly true that GM’s bankruptcy led to limited recoveries for 
various constituencies. And the GM bankruptcy case, more than others, 
exposed the plight of thousands of retirees, stockholders, and product 
liability claimants that the bankruptcy hit particularly hard.2 But the GM 
bankruptcy achieved results vastly better than the alternatives and, despite 
assertions of favoritism, provided all creditors with distributions consistent 
with the priority scheme established by Congress under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code.3 This Article will explore some of the criticisms leveled 
against the GM Chapter 11 process. 
In the final analysis, the executive branch, acting through the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (the U.S. Treasury), bravely stepped out of its 
comfort zone to lead an effort to grant GM and Chrysler fresh starts by 
using traditional Chapter 11 tools. These transactions were unprecedented, 
and success was in no way assured. Yet the Bankruptcy Code provided a 
legislative framework and judicial oversight that was tangible and against 
which the U.S. government’s actions could be evaluated. 
I. THE GENERAL MOTORS STORY 
We’ve got to go back to making things. 
President Barack H. Obama4 
A. THE FOUNDING AND IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL MOTORS TO THE 
NATION’S ECONOMY 
Founded in 1908 by William C. Durant, GM revolutionized the 
automotive market by adopting the groundbreaking strategy of “[a] car for 
every purse and purpose.”5 This strategy divided the automotive market into 
distinct price segments, from low-priced to luxury automobiles, and led GM 
to become one company growing through the creation and management of 
multiple brands. Throughout its history, GM produced some of the most 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Mike Spector, Car Bailouts Left Behind Crash Victims, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2011, at A1. 
 3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1146 (2006). 
 4. President Barack H. Obama, Address at Solyndra, Inc. in Fremond, California (May 26, 
2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-201000420.pdf. 
 5. GEN. MOTORS CORP., SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1925).  
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striking and memorable automotive designs, including the Chevrolet 
Corvette, Buick Riviera, and Cadillac Eldorado. For many years, GM 
supplied one in five vehicles driven in the United States.6 Its “highly-skilled 
engineering and development personnel [even] designed and manufactured . 
. . the first lunar roving vehicle driven on the moon.”7 
But it is neither the historical nor sentimental significance of GM that 
caused the U.S. and Canadian governments to jump to its aid in the tail end 
of 2008. At the time of the filing, GM was the largest U.S. automobile 
manufacturer and the second-largest automobile manufacturer in the world, 
with a reach across the U.S. and global economies. As of March 31, 2009, 
its consolidated global assets and liabilities totaled approximately $82.3 
billion and $172.8 billion, respectively, and it reported global revenues of 
approximately $150 billion for the 2008 fiscal year.8 Also, as of March 31, 
2009, GM employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide, of 
whom approximately 91,000 were residents of the United States.9  
GM relied not only upon its direct salaried and hourly employees but 
also upon the thousands of suppliers that, in turn, count on GM for their 
survival. These suppliers include a myriad of indirect suppliers (not Tier I 
part suppliers) such as advertising agencies and financial consulting and 
other service providers that supported GM’s operations. Each of these 
suppliers hired employees dedicated to the automotive industry. One 
quickly realizes the severe adverse impact that would occur to the U.S. 
economy if GM were to shut down operations. A contemporaneous 
liquidation of the even more financially precarious Chrysler could have 
exacerbated the effects on the U.S. work force in a worst case scenario. In 
fact, it is said that one in ten Americans, directly or indirectly, receives a 
paycheck from the automobile industry.10 
GM and its suppliers existed in a symbiotic relationship: each depended 
on the other for survival. In North America, GM relied upon approximately 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Affidavit of Fredrick A. Henderson Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 ¶ 20, In re 
Motors Liquidation Co., 2011 WL 3805896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (ECF No. 21) 
[hereinafter Henderson Affidavit]. Unless otherwise specified, all court document docket numbers 
contained herein are in reference to In re Motors Liquidation Co. (f/k/a Gen. Motors Corp.), 2011 
WL 3805896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (No. 09-50026), available at http://www.motorsliq 
uidationdocket.com/maincase.php3. 
 7. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 20. 
 8. Gen. Motors Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 2 (May 8, 2009). 
 9. Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363(b), and 507, 
(I) Authorizing Debtors to (a) Pay Certain Employee Compensation and Benefits and (b) Maintain 
and Continue Such Benefits and Other Employee-Related Programs and (II) Directing Banks to 
Honor Prepetition Checks for Payment of Prepetition Employee Obligations (ECF No. 33); 
Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 23. 
 10. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 48; SEAN P. MCALINDEN, KIM HILL, BERNARD 
SWIECKI, ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY–
AN UPDATE: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, 34 
(Economics and Business Group Center for Automotive Research, Fall 2003). 
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11,500 suppliers.11 For over 600 of such suppliers, including industry 
“heavyweights” such as Delphi Corporation, GM represented 30 percent or 
more of their annual revenues.12 In the years leading up to GM’s bankruptcy 
filing, GM made vendor payments totaling approximately $50 billion 
annually.13 Operating on a “just-in-time” inventory management model, 
GM typically assembles component parts from numerous suppliers into 
vehicles within a few hours of delivery to GM’s assembly facilities.14 While 
providing GM significant cost savings by reducing inventory expense, 
“just-in-time” manufacturing has one potentially fatal flaw—if one of the 
thousands of component parts is not timely delivered, the entire production 
line quickly grinds to a halt. Additionally, an overnight loss of a customer 
like GM could threaten the existence of a highly leveraged direct (Tier I) 
supplier. Because such suppliers also provided parts for Ford, Chrysler, and 
other original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), a GM shutdown could 
threaten the entire U.S. automotive industry. 
B. THE EVENTS LEADING TO GENERAL MOTORS’ BANKRUPTCY 
With an upside down balance sheet and ever increasing retiree costs and 
other long-term obligations, GM needed to restructure its operations and 
finances. The “Great Recession,” which began in the second half of 2007, 
was the triggering event that forced GM to come to terms with its issues 
and address them in a meaningful manner. GM had already been 
experiencing a downward trend in sales as GM’s U.S. market share (the 
largest single market for GM’s products) steadily declined from 45 percent 
in 1980 to 22 percent in 2008.15 This drop was due, in large part, to the fact 
that foreign OEMs (with lower cost structures and legacy benefit 
obligations) entered the market with cheaper alternatives to GM vehicles.16 
In recent years, the loss of market share had accelerated. In the fourth 
quarter of 2008, for example, GM’s domestic automobile sales decreased 
by 36 percent compared to the corresponding period in 2007.17 For the first 
quarter of 2009, GM’s domestic automobile sales plummeted by 49 percent 
compared to the corresponding period in 2008.18 The combination of 
sharply declining sales and enormously burdensome fixed costs opened a 
spigot of red ink. 
By the fall of 2008, GM was in the midst of a severe liquidity crisis, 
and its ability to continue operations grew increasingly uncertain. GM 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 25. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. ¶ 26. 
 15. Id. ¶ 10. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Id. ¶ 11. 
 18. Id. 
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previously had recognized the need to transform its operations and balance 
sheet to create a leaner, more efficient, and more profitable business. 
Unfortunately, because of the continuing and deepening recession, 
aggravated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on September 
15, 2008, GM was not able to achieve its objective. 
These exigent economic circumstances compelled GM to seek financial 
assistance from the U.S. government to sustain its operations. Both sides of 
the aisle in Congress took seriously the dire warnings that assistance was 
necessary to avoid a potentially fatal systemic failure throughout the 
domestic automotive industry, and the concomitant harm to the overall U.S. 
economy from the loss of hundreds of thousands to potentially millions of 
jobs. What faced the nation was not an isolated request for charity but the 
threat of a sequential shutdown of GM and hundreds of ancillary 
businesses. 
1. Viability Plan I—Too Little, Too Late 
On November 21, 2008, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Nancy Pelosi, and the Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, released a letter 
to the chief executive officers of GM, Chrysler, and Ford Motor Company, 
outlining the requirements for the domestic OEMs to request government 
loans, including the submission of additional information demonstrating 
future economic viability.19 
In response, on December 2, 2008, GM submitted to the Senate 
Banking Committee and the House of Representatives Financial Services 
Committee a proposed viability plan (Viability Plan I), pursuant to which 
GM committed to using “[g]overnment funding to exclusively sustain and 
restructure its operations in the United States and aggressively retool its 
product mix.”20 In Viability Plan I, GM requested an immediate loan of $4 
billion to ensure minimum liquidity through the end of 2008, a second $4 
billion draw in January 2009, a third draw of $2 billion in February 2009, 
and a fourth draw of $2 billion at an unstated date in 2009, under an 
aggregate loan facility of $12 billion.21 In addition, GM sought access to an 
incremental $6 billion line of credit, for a total of $18 billion in requested 
government loans.22 “Notwithstanding the critical need for emergency 
funding by domestic OEMs, Congress did not act on the request, and GM 
was compelled to seek immediate financial support from the U.S. Treasury 
to avoid the suspension of operations.”23 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Letter from Pelosi, Reid to Auto Makers on Terms, BLOGS.WSJ.COM (Nov. 21, 2008, 5:44 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/autoshow/2008/11/21/letter-form-pelosi-reid-to-auto-makers-on-terms/. 
 20. Gen. Motors Corp., Restructuring Plan for Long-Term Viability, Dec. 2, 2008, at 4 
[hereinafter Viability Plan I]. 
 21. Id. at 5. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 53. 
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2. A Helping Hand from the U.S. Treasury 
On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush announced that the 
outgoing administration would make short-term, emergency funding 
available to GM and Chrysler under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP)24 to prevent both companies from commencing immediate 
bankruptcy cases and potentially becoming subject to a fire-sale liquidation. 
“On December 31, 2008, GM and the U.S. Treasury entered into an 
agreement . . . that provided GM with emergency financing of up to an 
initial $13.4 billion pursuant to a secured term loan facility.”25 On the same 
day, GM accessed the facility and borrowed $4 billion from the U.S. 
Treasury.26 GM would borrow an additional $5.4 billion on January 21, 
2009 and the remaining $4 billion on February 17, 2009.27 In addition, on 
April 29, 2009, the Canadian and Ontario governments, through the Export 
Development Canada (the Canadian EDC)28 provided bridge financing to 
GM in the form of a three-year C$3 billion term loan.29 By the time GM 
would enter bankruptcy, GM would have drawn down approximately $400 
million on the facility.30 
3. Viability Plan II—Back to the Drawing Board 
Like the congressional mandate, the U.S. Treasury facility required GM 
to develop a plan to transform its business and demonstrate future viability. 
But subsequent to December 2, 2008, when GM submitted Viability Plan I, 
the continued decline of global economic conditions, when combined with 
public speculation about GM’s future and survival, further reduced GM’s 
sales, volume, revenue, and cash flow. GM was on the brink of a downward 
death spiral. 
In February 2009, President Obama formed the Presidential Task Force 
on the Auto Industry, which included cabinet level officials, to evaluate 
available options (the Automotive Task Force).31 Also assembled was a 
                                                                                                                 
 24. 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2006). 
 25. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 54. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. The Canadian EDC is Canada’s government-owned export credit agency that provides 
financing, insurance, and risk management to Canadian exporters and investors. Id. ¶ 117. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. ¶ 118. 
 31. The members of the Automotive Task Force were: the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner; the Director of the National Economic Council, Lawrence H. 
Summers; the secretaries of Transportation, Commerce, Labor, and Energy; the Chair of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; 
the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator; and the Director of the White House Office 
of Energy and Climate Change. Press Release, the White House, Geithner, Summers Convene 
Official Designees to Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry (Feb. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/geithner-summers-convene-official-designees-presi 
dential-task-force-auto-industry [hereinafter Task Force Designee Press Release]. 
2011] Retooling General Motors 109 
team of savvy restructuring and legal professionals (Team Auto) that was 
responsible for managing the day-to-day restructuring initiatives and 
negotiations.32 
On February 17, 2009, GM submitted a greatly revised business plan 
designed to achieve and sustain GM’s long-term viability, international 
competitiveness, and energy efficiency (Viability Plan II).33 Viability 
Plan II attempted to address improvement to GM’s revenues, costs, and 
balance sheet for its U.S. and foreign operations, as well as GM’s plan to 
reduce petroleum dependency and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Although GM proposed to close fourteen plants and decrease its global 
work force by 47,000 (including 10,000 white-collar workers), GM’s initial 
proposal failed to sufficiently overhaul its operations.34 The initial plan did 
not provide for mandated labor concessions and benefits modifications or 
overall reduction of GM bond obligations.35 More importantly, the proposal 
premised GM’s continued survival on tenuous, optimistic assumptions, 
which, if GM missed, could easily return it to financial distress.36 For 
example, if GM missed its projected share of overall global sales by 1 
percent, GM would suffer a $2 billion cash flow reduction.37 
On March 30, 2009, President Obama announced that Viability Plan II 
failed to provide a means for GM “not only to survive, but succeed in this 
competitive global market.”38 President Obama outlined a series of actions 
that GM needed to take to receive additional federal assistance, including 
reaching an agreement with its unions regarding labor and legacy 
obligations, and with its bondholders regarding debt reduction, as well as 
submitting a revised business plan that was more aggressive in terms of 
scope and timing.39 
President Obama indicated that the U.S. Treasury would extend 
additional secured financing for working capital for a period of another 
sixty days, during which GM would need to negotiate, develop, and 
implement a more aggressive and comprehensive viability plan.40 GM 
                                                                                                                 
 32. The name “Team Auto” was coined by Steven L. Rattner. Team Auto included, among 
others, Ron Bloom, Steven L. Rattner, Harry Wilson, and Matthew A. Feldman. Both Wilson and 
Feldman had extensive restructuring backgrounds and were the lead negotiators for Team Auto. 
Wilson was a partner at Silver Point Capital, a well-known hedge fund in the restructuring arena, 
and Feldman was a senior restructuring partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. Id.  
 33. Gen. Motors Corp., 2009–2014 Restructuring Plan, Feb. 17, 2009 [hereinafter Viability 
Plan II]. 
 34. Id. at 13, 23. 
 35. Viability Plan I, supra note 20. 
 36. See Declaration of Harry Wilson, Ex. B, 3–5 (ECF No. 2577) (Determination of Viability 
Summary General Motors Corporation) [hereinafter Wilson Declaration].  
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on the American Automotive Industry (Mar. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-american-
automotive-industry-33009). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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would inevitably borrow an additional $4 billion from the U.S. Treasury. 
President Obama stated publicly for the first time in March 2009 that GM 
needed a fresh start to implement such a plan and suggested that the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code could be used as a mechanism to help the company 
restructure quickly and emerge stronger.41 President Obama set a deadline 
of June 1, 2009 for GM to demonstrate that its viability plan would 
fundamentally transform GM’s operations into a profitable and competitive 
American car company.42 
By this time, GM realized that token cost saving measures would not be 
acceptable, and future government assistance would not be an open-ended 
bailout, but rather, would be dependent on a substantial reduction in debt. 
Specifically, the Automotive Task Force required GM to “substantially 
reduce GM’s outstanding debt and existing liabilities to a level where they 
[were] consistent with both its normalized cash flow and the cyclical nature 
of its business.”43 The only way to accomplish this outside of bankruptcy 
would be a voluntary exchange of the company’s public debt for equity. On 
April 27, 2009, GM launched an out-of-court restructuring through a public 
exchange offer, which would have substantially reduced GM’s $27 billion 
in long-term obligations.44 The exchange offer would have consolidated 
GM’s obligations to the U.S. Treasury and was conditioned on reducing 
retiree benefits by $10 billion.45 The exchange offer, however, failed to 
garner sufficient support from GM bondholders. 
GM was now out of options. The company was simply too large to 
attract a private purchaser or new lending source. But management, now 
without CEO Rick Wagoner, who resigned on March 29, 200946 amid 
pressure from the U.S. government, was doubtful that GM could survive a 
protracted Chapter 11 case.47 
4. Planning the 363 Transaction—Daring to Whisper the “B” 
Word 
Out of options to complete an out-of-court restructuring, GM and Team 
Auto began seriously discussing the bankruptcy alternatives. Because the 
U.S. Treasury was not prepared to fund a long-term debtor-in-possession 
financing package while the parties negotiated the future of GM in a “free 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36 (Obama Administration New Path to Viability for GM 
& Chrysler, Detailed Findings on GM and Chrysler Plans). 
 44. See Gen. Motors Corp., Tender Offer Statement (Sch. to Rule 14d-10) (Apr. 27, 2009); 
Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 71. 
 45. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 72. 
 46. Gen. Motors Corp., Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 8-K) (Apr. 2, 2009). 
 47. Viability Plan II, supra note 33, at 34 (“The Company remains convinced bankruptcy 
would be protracted with a significant possibility that exit would not be achieved.”). 
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fall” bankruptcy, a deal structure was necessary to extract GM’s business 
and operating assets from bankruptcy as quickly as possible. A 
“prepackaged” Chapter 11 case with pre-filing solicitation of creditors 
could be concluded quickly with creditor support but likely would have met 
the same fate as the failed exchange offer. Moreover, a “prepackaged” 
Chapter 11 case would have limited GM’s ability to reject contracts and 
shutter non-core operations, thus failing to achieve the goals set by the 
Automotive Task Force.  
No one had a true level of confidence that GM could have sustained 
even its severely weakened sales levels during an expedited plan process. 
GM and the restructuring professionals on Team Auto came to realize that, 
under the circumstances, an expedited sale of substantially all of GM’s 
operating assets was the only reasonable course of action. Given the 
amounts that the U.S. Treasury and Canadian EDC had lent, and would be 
lending as a first priority loan, a credit bid of the debt for the assets and a 
portion of the equity of the newly formed company, coupled with cash to 
fund a wind-down of the estate left behind, would constitute a formidable 
and appropriate stalking-horse bid to acquire GM’s assets and operations. 
With new leadership in place following Rick Wagoner’s departure, GM 
was open to utilizing the bankruptcy laws to implement a transaction under 
which substantially all of GM’s operational assets would be sold, subject to 
any higher or better offers, in an expedited process under § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a debtor 
to use, sell, or lease property of the debtor’s estate outside the ordinary 
course of its business, subject to notice and a hearing.48 
The U.S. and Canadian governments began designing the framework of 
a sale (the 363 Transaction) whereby they would contribute their notes 
representing billions of dollars of secured loans to a newly formed U.S. 
Treasury-sponsored entity that would later become the new General Motors 
Company (the Purchaser or New GM), which, in turn, would credit bid the 
debt to acquire GM’s operating assets. The Purchaser would assume certain 
specified liabilities that were necessary to preserve the going-concern value 
of the enterprise and create a “New GM” free of virtually all entanglement 
with bankruptcy. Any unprofitable or non-core assets would remain with 
GM’s bankruptcy estate (Old GM) which would be disposed of by Old GM 
in an orderly fashion. This stratagem was groundbreaking in that just a few 
weeks earlier, Rick Wagoner reportedly announced publicly that 
bankruptcy for GM was not a viable option as “no one would buy a car 
from a bankrupt company.”49 
                                                                                                                 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). 
 49. Alison Fitzgerald & Julianna Goldman, Obama Saving GM Needed Dealmaker Team to 
Break It (Update2),   BLOOMBERG,   June 1, 2009,   http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=alvxAe73XHbM. 
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The proposed 363 Transaction would not only address GM’s debt 
obligations but would also significantly restructure its future legacy 
obligations to its employees through a settlement with the International 
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America (UAW)—the labor union that represented the largest 
portion of GM’s U.S. unionized employees.50 Resolution of the legacy 
retirement benefit issues and work rules for a refocused employer was a 
gating issue. Concessions were necessary to clean up the balance sheet and 
ensure future viability. Yet, as described in more detail below, the 
Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that limit a debtor’s ability to modify 
retiree benefits and collective bargaining agreements without protracted 
negotiations and possible litigation that, in this case, would have 
jeopardized an expeditious exit from bankruptcy for the operating assets.51 
A consensual deal with the UAW would be critical. 
With the structure now set, Team Auto, with input from the U.S. 
Treasury, the Automotive Task Force, and the Canadian EDC, fully 
negotiated the Master Sale and Purchase Agreement and completed its due 
diligence on the assets to be acquired and contracts to be assigned to the 
Purchaser. Simultaneously, GM, with significant assistance from Team 
Auto, negotiated a settlement and an amended collective bargaining 
agreement that contained significant cash and non-cash concessions from 
the UAW in exchange for, among other things, a 17.5 percent stake in New 
GM common stock.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See infra text accompanying note 110. 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1114. 
 52. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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Under the 363 Transaction, the equity of the Purchaser (i.e., New GM) 
would be distributed initially as follows53: 
 
 New Common 
Stock 
Series A 
Preferred Stock
Warrants 
U.S. Treasury 60.8% $2.1 billion  
Canadian EDC 11.7% $400 million  
UAW’s new 
voluntary 
employee 
beneficiary 
association trust 
17.5% $6.5 billion 6-year warrants 
to acquire 2.5% 
of New GM 
common stock 
with an exercise 
price based on 
$75 billion total 
equity value 
Old GM 10%, plus up to 
an additional 2% 
of New GM 
common stock if 
general 
unsecured 
claims exceed 
$35 billion 
 Two sets of 
warrants, each to 
acquire 7.5% of 
outstanding New 
GM common 
stock with an 
exercise price of 
$15 billion and 
$30 billion total 
equity value 
 
As proposed, the 363 Transaction would preserve the value of GM as 
an operating enterprise (i.e., going-concern value, not mere liquidation); 
avoid the domino effect upon other OEMs and Tier I suppliers that would 
follow a GM liquidation; continue employment for hundreds of thousands 
of persons at GM, as well as employees of those employers who rely upon 
GM; protect the many communities dependent on the continuation of the 
business; restore consumer confidence in GM and its products and dealers; 
and establish an automotive manufacturing business that would be viable, 
competitive, and reliable, as well as a standard bearer and bellwether 
industry considered essential for the United States. 
C. THE GENERAL MOTORS BANKRUPTCY 
In the face of this crisis, which threatened the liquidation of not only 
GM but also the automobile industry of the United States, GM filed for 
bankruptcy protection on June 1, 2009, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 482–83. 
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Southern District of New York (the Bankruptcy Court) under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.54 
1. Implementing the 363 Transaction 
GM concurrently filed, with its voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief, 
a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting approval of the 363 
Transaction, under which the debtors would sell their operating assets to the 
Purchaser in exchange for a package of cash and non-cash consideration 
valued at over $90 billion, subject to any higher or better offers.55 On 
June 2, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court, after notice and a hearing, approved 
notice and other related procedures and set June 19, 2009 as the deadline for 
parties to object to the proposed transaction, June 22, 2009 as the deadline 
to submit any higher or better bids, and June 30, 2009 as the date for a 
hearing to consider approval of the transaction and opposition thereto.56 
Although opposing parties filed hundreds of objections to the 363 
Transaction, GM received neither any meaningful bids nor any other 
alternative proposals to the 363 Transaction. Notably, no objector argued 
that the 363 Transaction was not in GM’s best interests. The evidentiary 
record in this regard was undisputed. As the Bankruptcy Court found, “the 
only alternative to an immediate sale [was] liquidation,” in which case 
unsecured creditors would recover nothing and secured creditors would 
receive only a portion of their claim.57 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court 
found that the U.S. Treasury, with the support of the Canadian EDC, was 
the only entity prepared to finance the Chapter 11 cases, and such financing 
was conditioned on the satisfaction of certain milestones for completion of 
the sale transaction.58 
On July 5, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued a decision and order 
overruling all remaining objections, and authorized the 363 Transaction. 
The sale of GM’s continuing business closed on July 10, 2009.59 On the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 (ECF No. 1). 
 55. Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363(b), (f), (k), and (m), and 365 and Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, and 6006, to (I) Approve (A) the Sale Pursuant to the Master Sale and 
Purchase Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-Sponsored 
Purchaser, Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Other Interests; (B) the 
Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (C) Other 
Relief; and (II) Scheduling Sale Approval Hearing (ECF No. 92).  
 56. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363, and 365 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 6004, and 
6006 (I) Approving Procedures for Sale of Debtors’ Assets Pursuant to Master Sale and Purchase 
Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC, a U.S. Treasury-Sponsored Purchaser; 
(II) Scheduling Bid Deadline and Sale Hearing Date; (III) Establishing Assumption and 
Assignment Procedures; and (IV) Fixing Notice Procedures and Approving Form of Notice (ECF 
No. 274). 
 57. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 474, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 58. Id. at 480. 
 59. Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan at 31 (ECF No. 8023) 
[hereinafter Disclosure Statement]. 
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closing date, the Purchaser took on the name General Motors Company 
(i.e., New GM), and the entity formerly known as General Motors 
Corporation changed its name to Motors Liquidation Company.60 Less than 
eighteen months later, in November 2010, New GM conducted an initial 
public offering of stock held by the U.S. Treasury and Canadian EDC and 
returned to the big board of the New York Stock Exchange.61 
2. “Old” General Motors and the Wind-Down Process 
Motors Liquidation Company remained in Chapter 11 following the 
sale to manage the wind-down of the remaining assets, as well as the 
resolution of all remaining claims against it (i.e., all liabilities not assumed 
by New GM). These claims included many types of general unsecured 
claims (e.g., breach of contract and rejection damage claims, personal injury 
and product liability tort claims, off-site environmental liabilities, etc.) and 
certain secured, administrative, and priority claims. To fund the 
administration of Old GM’s wind-down and ensure that the 363 Transaction 
sale consideration, in the form of stock and warrants, would be available for 
Old GM’s general unsecured creditors, the U.S. Treasury and Canadian 
EDC agreed to provide $1.175 billion in secured post-petition financing.62 
This financing would be used for, among other things, the cleanup and 
maintenance of remaining real estate holdings. 
To establish the potential universe of liabilities, Motors Liquidation 
Company filed with the Bankruptcy Court its schedules of assets and 
liabilities, on which it listed all the obligations that it believed it owed to its 
creditors.63 To the extent a creditor disagreed with the amounts set forth on 
the schedules, it was required to file a proof of claim establishing the basis 
of such claim.64 Creditors filed over 80,000 claims with asserted amounts 
aggregating more than $246 billion. 
The make-up of remaining creditors of Old GM was unique. In a typical 
large Chapter 11 case, creditors include trade vendors, contract 
counterparties, and financial institutions holding long-term debt. In this 
case, many of Old GM’s creditors were ordinary Americans—for example, 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Amended Notice of Change of Case Caption, (ECF No. 3106). 
 61. Gen. Motors Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 18, 2010). 
 62. Disclosure Statement, supra note 59, at 28. 
 63. See Statement of Financial Affairs for Motors Liquidation Co. (f/k/a General Motors 
Corp.) (ECF No. 4060-78); see also Notice of Filing of Amendment to Motors Liquidation Co.’s 
Schedules of Assets and Liabilities (ECF No. 4161); see also Schedules of Assets and Liabilities 
for Remediation and Liability Management Company, Inc. (ECF No. 4244-47). 
 64. See Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 
3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim (Including Claims under 
Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9)) and Procedures Relating Thereto and Approving the Form 
and Manner of Notice Thereof (ECF No. 4079); See also Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of 
the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs 
of Claim (Including Claims under Bankruptcy Rule 503(b)(9)) and Procedures Relating Thereto 
and Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof (ECF No. 4586). 
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middle class Americans who counted on GM as a blue chip haven for their 
most precious retirement savings. 
Additionally, like every other major automotive manufacturer, GM 
faced thousands of lawsuits at any given time for alleged product defects 
resulting in road accidents. The size and breadth of GM, however, permitted 
it to accept significant risk for general liability exposure. It was self-insured 
for personal injury and most product liability claims up to $35 million per 
claim. The lack of third-party insurance meant that these claimants, who 
had already suffered tragic losses, would be treated as any other creditor of 
GM and receive cents on the dollar.65 
To ease the burden of the claims reconciliation process, Old GM 
established omnibus claims objection and settlement procedures consistent 
with those used in other large Chapter 11 cases.66 These procedures 
supplemented existing claims resolution procedures set forth in the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to address the unprecedented number of 
claims filed.67 Claimants were welcomed to participate in hearings by 
telephone, often at Old GM’s cost in the case of individual claimants, which 
significantly reduced the burden of participating in the case. The ability to 
tell one’s stories of the impact that the GM bankruptcy had had on one’s 
life, through letters, pleadings, and arguments to the court, served for many 
as a needed cathartic exercise that would not have been available in a 
government takeover or other non-judicial process. 
Old GM also implemented alternative dispute resolution procedures to 
assist in the resolution of claims.68 These procedures established an 
informal negotiation period which would be followed by a mediation 
conducted by a member of a panel selected by the claimant. As of late 2011, 
this process had resulted in the consensual resolution of asserted liabilities 
totaling over $10 billion. 
As of June 30, 2011, Motors Liquidation Company has objected to 
more than 65,000 claims, settled hundreds of claims, and conducted 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Unlike with the claims of other creditors that could be adjudicated quickly in the 
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to estimate or liquidate personal 
injury claims. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2006). Thus, claimants holding such claims were faced with 
the prospect of prosecuting full trials in other fora before any personal injury claimant would be 
able to participate in creditor distributions. 
 66. See, e.g., Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 9019(b) 
Authorizing the Debtors to (I) File Omnibus Claims Objections and (II) Establish Procedures for 
Settling Certain Claims (ECF No. 4180). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and General Order M-390 Authorizing 
Implementation of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, Including Mandatory Mediation 
(ECF No. 5037); Amended Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and General Order M-390 
Authorizing Implementation of Alternative Dispute Procedures, Including Mandatory Mediation 
(ECF No. 7558). 
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numerous mediations, all resulting in a reduction of general unsecured 
liabilities to an aggregate maximum of less than $39.5 billion.69 
II. CRITICISMS OF THE GM “BAILOUT” 
Naysayers of the GM rescue fall into three categories: (1) those who 
express a lack of confidence that GM could be run successfully from within 
the D.C. Beltway; (2) those who believe that certain constituents (e.g., the 
UAW) received beneficial treatment to the detriment of other more 
deserving groups; and (3) those who believe that the government had 
stepped over constitutional boundaries by providing financial taxpayer 
support to, and acquiring the equity of, GM. 
A. THE OBAMA MOTOR CO.? 
Does anyone really believe that politicians and bureaucrats in Washington can 
successfully steer a multi-national corporation to economic viability? 
Congressman John Boehner70 
In the planning stages of the auto “bailout,” there was tremendous 
skepticism that the government could take effective control of GM without 
the process becoming a failed political exercise.71 With access to billions of 
dollars of taxpayer funds in play, the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive 
Task Force wielded extraordinary power to control not only whether GM 
and Chrysler could reorganize, but also to dictate how such a reorganization 
(or liquidation) would occur and which voting districts would be the net 
winners and losers. 
In retrospect, a restructuring plan for GM easily could have been 
bogged down in debate over a variety of decisions that ultimately would 
have significant local impact, such as which plants to close, which vendor 
contracts to continue, and which brand names to retire. Critics were on firm 
ground in raising concerns about the ability of politicians to sacrifice their 
own constituencies for the common good. Yet despite the public nature of 
the bankruptcy filing, the restructuring of GM was largely unaffected by 
political grandstanding. There were three main reasons for this: the 
Automotive Task Force and Team Auto, the use of TARP funds, and the 
speed of the transaction. 
1. The Automotive Task Force and Team Auto 
First and foremost, the organization and utilization of the Automotive 
Task Force (and, in particular, of Team Auto) was a well-designed move to 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust Quarterly GUC Trust Reports as of June 30, 
2011 (ECF No. 10648). 
 70. Congressman John Boehner, Remarks Regarding the Federal Bail-Out of GM and Chrysler 
(June 1, 2009). 
 71. See, e.g., The Obama Motor Co., WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A11. 
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divorce the negotiation of the actual terms of the sale transaction from the 
political arena. Team Auto was not the product of partisan politics, but 
rather, its members were recruited, in large part, from hedge funds and Wall 
Street law firms. These professionals understood distressed investing and 
ran the transaction much like they would a private equity deal. The 
Automotive Task Force mandated that Team Auto conduct due diligence, 
make reasonable business judgments, and fashion a transaction geared more 
toward maximizing the value of the reorganized enterprise than fulfilling 
noneconomic objectives.72 This is not to say that Team Auto was free from 
political pressures.73 Nevertheless, given the momentum and speed of the 
transaction and the identity of the negotiators on the front lines, the 
restructuring process stayed on track. 
Had the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive Task Force been driven by 
political concerns, they could have structured the requirements set forth for 
the $13.4 billion bridge loan to preserve constituency interests. In contrast, 
the U.S. Treasury and the Automotive Task Force took a hard-nosed 
approach that required a restructured GM “not only to survive, but to 
succeed in this competitive global market[.]”74 In doing so, the Automotive 
Task Force created accountability to generate positive cash flow and 
maintain a competitive advantage over other OEMs.75 Noticeably absent 
from the sale agreement were “pork barrel” conditions or terms 
improvidently favoring specific constituencies. As a point of comparison, 
the French government conditioned €6.5 billion in loans made to French 
automotive manufacturers Peugeot S.A. and Renault S.A. upon no plant 
closures or compulsory work force reductions during the five-year terms of 
the loans, despite some industry experts suggesting that the French 
automotive industry has one-third more jobs and plants than it needs.76 
Other European countries have also raised warnings about plant closures by 
linking jobs to bailout aid.77 For example, the restructuring of GM’s 
European Opel operations became a tug-of-war between Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain as each country sought to preserve factories 
located in their respective countries irrespective of whether a business case 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 60–61. 
 73. See generally STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 238–39, 246–47, 262–63 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010). 
 74. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on the American Automotive Industry 4 (Mar. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-american-
automotive-industry-33009); see also Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 63. 
 75. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36 (Obama Administration New Path to Viability for GM 
& Chrysler, Detailed Findings on GM and Chrysler Plans). 
 76. John Reed & Anousha Sakoui, Carmaking: A Fork in the Road, FIN. TIMES, Dec.10, 2009, 
at 7. 
 77. Id. 
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existed for the continued operation of the factory.78 The GM sale and the 
loan transactions generally were free from such conditions. 
2. The Use of TARP 
The fact that Congress pre-authorized the mechanism by which the U.S. 
Treasury would provide funding for the GM bankruptcy and the subsequent 
wind-down served, without a doubt, to reduce political interference with 
completion of the transaction. One could easily surmise that if the funding 
of GM and the sale transaction was put before Congress for approval 
independently from TARP, the ensuing debate over the specifics of the 
surviving company’s business plan could have either resulted in a larger, 
less nimble, and more precarious enterprise, or could have damaged value 
simply by bogging down and delaying the transaction to the detriment of 
value. 
3. The Speed of the Transaction 
By the time GM filed its Chapter 11 case on June 1, 2009, GM had 
fully negotiated the structure and terms of the sale with the U.S. Treasury. 
GM also reached agreements with an ad hoc group of bondholders and the 
UAW. The Bankruptcy Court approved the transaction, and the parties 
consummated the sale, just thirty-nine days after the commencement of the 
Chapter 11 case. The speed at which this case was conducted was not 
designed to squelch political opposition, but was necessary for appropriate 
business concerns.79 
Although the Bankruptcy Court approval process played out publicly, 
and was the subject of a three-day evidentiary hearing on the propriety of 
the transaction, the speed at which the sale was conducted left little time for 
special interest groups to mobilize and exert pressure to modify the terms of 
the 363 Transaction. Accordingly, the economic underpinnings of the 
restructuring negotiated by Team Auto remained fundamentally unaltered. 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Paul Betts, Spain Risks Losing to Germany and UK in Opel Game, FIN. TIMES, Oct.16, 
2009, at 16. 
 79. Harvey R. Miller, a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, stated to the 
Bankruptcy Court at the sale hearing: 
[I]f there’s going to be a recovery of value for the assets of General Motors, it’s 
necessary in an absolute sense that the assets be sold as quickly as possible to a 
purchaser who will immediately commence and resume the operations of a new 
General Motors. That is the primary objective of these Chapter 11 cases and why 
General Motors has elected to proceed pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code 
to sell substantially all of its assets. 
Transcript of Hearing at 38:18–25 (ECF No. 374). 
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B. IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION? 
The truth is that the bailouts and bankruptcy processes of GM and Chrysler were 
riddled with unethical conduct and blatantly favored the politically 
 powerful UAW over other classes. 
Mark Modica80 
Opponents of the 363 Transaction allege that, relative to other creditor 
constituencies, the UAW and its membership received a “sweetheart” deal 
and obtained better treatment than they were entitled. The deal struck 
between New GM and the UAW, however, exemplifies the hardball and 
realistic economic approach undertaken by the Automotive Task Force and 
Team Auto. The legal requirements of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provided the UAW 
with significant leverage and a seat at the table of GM’s restructuring. 
Before exploring the details of the UAW negotiations, it is beneficial to 
examine the legal framework within which GM and the U.S. government 
needed to engage the UAW. 
1. Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
Bankruptcy 
A Chapter 11 debtor may generally either “assume” or “reject” any 
executory contract as part of its reorganization process, based on its 
assessment of whether the contract provides a benefit to or is necessary for 
the company’s reorganization.81 While there is no definition for “executory 
contracts” in the Bankruptcy Code, an “executory contract” is typically 
viewed as a contract by which the parties owe material obligations to one 
another.82 Collective bargaining agreements are considered executory 
contracts. 
By assumption of a contract, a company assumes all liabilities under the 
agreement and the agreement continues forward with the reorganized 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Mark Modica, Let’s Not Forget Ethical Shortcomings of Auto Bailout, NAT’L LEGAL AND 
POLICY CTR. (June 28, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/06/28/ex-car-czar%E2%80 
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 81. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2006). 
 82. Professor Countryman’s definition of executory contract was expressed as follows: “A 
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company after it exits bankruptcy.83 Debtors typically assume contracts 
which are profitable or otherwise provide some necessary benefit to the 
company (e.g., a below market rate lease). In contrast, by rejecting a 
contract, a company is relieved of all future obligations under the contract, 
and all claims arising from the contract are treated as claims arising prior to 
the bankruptcy case.84 Debtors typically reject contracts where the debtor’s 
obligations are more burdensome than the totality of future benefits (e.g., an 
above market supply contract). Whether a debtor could assume or reject an 
agreement is generally subject to the debtor’s business judgment.85 The 
mere threat of rejection often provides valuable leverage for a debtor to 
renegotiate the terms of burdensome executory contracts. 
Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that codified      
§ 1113, the majority of federal circuit courts of appeals agreed that under 
the Bankruptcy Code, collective bargaining agreements could be rejected 
like any other executory contract. These courts, however, differed over 
whether to apply a stricter standard.86 In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the 
Supreme Court held that a debtor may reject a collective bargaining 
agreement, but that the bankruptcy court should apply a higher standard 
than that applied to the rejection of other types of executory contracts.87 The 
Court also held that a bankruptcy court should approve rejection of a 
collective bargaining agreement if the debtor can demonstrate that the 
agreement “burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities 
balance in favor of rejecting the contract labor.”88 The Court further ruled 
that rejection is appropriate when “reasonable efforts to negotiate a 
                                                                                                                 
 83. 11 U.S.C. § 365; NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984); see also 
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Compare NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 682 F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is not qualified by the 
restrictions of § 8(d) of the NLRA on modification), aff’d, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), with 
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 
1975) (requiring debtor in possession to show not only that the collective bargaining 
agreement is burdensome to the estate, but also that the equities balance in favor of 
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(stating its “reluctance to accept the rationale for [the] heightened scrutiny” given to the 
rejection of labor agreements), aff’d, 48 B.R. 315 (N.D. Iowa 1985). 
Mark A. Jacoby, Michael K. Kam & Jose Singer-Freeman, Collective Bargaining Agreements, 
Employee Benefits, and Executive Compensation, in 2 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, 
REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES 24-5 n.7 (rev. ed. 2006). 
 87. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 516, 524. 
 88. Id. at 526. 
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voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce a 
prompt and satisfactory solution.” 89 
Organized labor lobbied Congress to overturn Bildisco and change the 
standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements.90 As a result, in 
1984, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to include a specific 
provision that articulated a new, more labor-friendly standard, as well as 
procedures, for rejecting collective bargaining agreements; these were 
codified in § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1113 sets forth the 
exclusive procedures pursuant to which a debtor may reject a collective 
bargaining agreement.91 Congress also shifted jurisdiction and oversight 
from the National Labor Relations Board to the federal bankruptcy courts.92 
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a debtor seek 
bankruptcy court approval to reject a collective bargaining agreement.93 To 
obtain bankruptcy court approval to reject, the debtor must satisfy certain 
requirements.94 Until these requirements are met, the debtor is prohibited 
from unilaterally altering any term.95 
First, prior to applying to a bankruptcy court for rejection, the debtor 
must “make a proposal to the [union], based on the most complete and 
reliable information available at the time, . . . which [identifies] those 
modifications [to] the employees[’] benefits and protections that are 
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor.”96 The proposal must 
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 90. Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 2. 
 91. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (2006).  
 92. Jacoby, Kam & Singer-Freeman, supra note 86, at 24-8.  
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§ 1113(e) authorizes such relief. Id. § 1113(e).  
 96.  11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A). “[T]he ‘necessary’ requirement has been the subject of 
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Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82[, 88–90] (2d Cir. 1987); 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074[, 1086–
89] (3d Cir. 1986); Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 211 v. Family Snacks, 
Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884[, 892–97] (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); In re 
Tex. Sheet Metals, Inc., 90 B.R. 260, 265 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988); see also 7 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1113.06(2) (Lawrence P. King, Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005); Daniel Keating, The Continuing Puzzle of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 526–34 (1994); 
Anne J. McClain, Note, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113 and the Simple Rejection of 
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Labor Loses Again, 80 GEO. L.J. 191[, 206–08] 
(1991) (criticizing courts for focusing on necessary requirement); Kay M. Rector, 
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assure “that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties [will be] 
treated fairly and equitably.”97 The debtor must also provide to the union 
“relevant information . . . necessary to evaluate the proposal.”98 
Additionally, “[b]etween the time of the making of the proposal and the 
time of the hearing on the rejection of the existing collective bargaining 
agreement, the debtor must meet and confer with the union in good faith in 
an attempt to reach a voluntary settlement.”99 
A bankruptcy court may authorize rejection only if the union has 
refused to accept the debtor’s proposal without good cause and the balance 
of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining 
agreement.100 Although courts differ on what constitutes “good cause,” a 
debtor does not need to show bad faith.101 Rather, if a debtor can 
demonstrate that a union has rejected a proposal that meets its needs and 
preserves the debtor’s required savings, the bankruptcy court may find that 
the union has rejected the proposal without “good cause.”102 
Section 1113 makes rejection of a collective bargaining agreement an 
extraordinarily difficult process. In fact, compliance with § 1113 would be 
virtually impossible in the timeframe that would be available in the 363 
Transaction. Further, the NLRA requires a purchaser of a business to 
negotiate a successor agreement with a union in good faith.103 Given the 
precarious nature of GM, it is highly doubtful whether GM could have 
survived a prolonged renegotiation process. 
2. Retiring Retiree Benefits 
Section 1114 similarly shields retiree benefits from modification during 
the Chapter 11 process. The Bankruptcy Code defines “retiree benefits” as, 
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efforts to negotiate or provide a counter proposal”); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 
647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding union did not have “good cause” for refusing proposal for 
modifications of collective bargaining agreement where provisions inhibiting debtor’s outsourcing 
would be eliminated). 
 103. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
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payments to any entity or person for the purpose of providing or 
reimbursing payments for retired employees and their spouses and 
dependents, for medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in 
the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death under any plan, fund, or 
program . . . maintained or established in whole or in part by the debtor 
prior to filing a petition commencing a case under this title.104 
Pursuant to § 1114(c)(1), a labor organization or union is the 
“authorized representative” for those “receiving retiree benefits covered by 
a collective bargaining agreement to which such labor organization is a 
[party], unless . . . [the union] elects not to serve . . . or the court, upon 
motion by any party in interest, . . . determines that different representation 
. . . is appropriate.”105 Section 1114(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides 
that if a labor organization elects not to serve as the authorized 
representative, the court shall, “upon a motion by any party in interest and 
after notice and a hearing, . . . appoint a committee of retired employees [to 
represent all such retirees] if the debtor seeks to modify or [terminate] 
retiree benefits.”106 To the extent the retiree benefits received are not 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court 
appoints an authorized representative of the retirees to negotiate with the 
debtor.107 A committee created pursuant to § 1114 has “the same rights, 
powers, and duties” as creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees 
appointed under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code.108 
A debtor is required to timely pay and may not modify any retiree 
benefits unless the court, on motion of the debtor or the authorized 
representative, authorizes modification. These modifications would be 
authorized only after certain conditions are met or if the debtor and the 
authorized representative agree to such modifications.109 The process for 
involuntary modification is similar to the process under § 1113 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Like § 1113, § 1114 effectively ties the hands of Chapter 11 debtors 
that need to move expeditiously through the Chapter 11 process. For the 
debtor, litigation is often not a prudent course unless survival depends on 
the requested modifications. 
                                                                                                                 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2006). 
 105. Id. § 1114(c)(1). 
 106. Id. § 1114(c)(2). 
 107. Id. § 1114(d). 
 108. Id. § 1114(b)(2).  
 109. Id. § 1114(e), (l). 
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3. Negotiating with the UAW 
The UAW represented most of GM’s unionized employees.110 It was 
also GM’s largest unsecured creditor because of the prior restructuring of 
GM’s healthcare obligations through the use of voluntary employee 
beneficiary associations (VEBAs) under § 501(c)(9) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986.111 Given §§ 1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and other applicable law, the UAW could have demanded that all claims 
arising from their collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefit plans 
ride through any GM reorganization unscathed. As a point of reference, 
numerous other Chapter 11 debtors have gone through arduous litigation, 
only to leave their collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefits 
substantially untouched.112 
The UAW could have also tapped its considerable political capital to 
impose significant pressure for many elected officials, including President 
Obama. But, from the beginningincluding the initial December 2008 
bridge loanthe U.S. government conditioned any funding on GM coming 
to terms with its legacy employee obligations and a reduction of 
unnecessary production capacity (i.e., layoffs). The UAW’s collective 
bargaining agreement and GM’s retiree benefit plans needed to be recut. 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Approximately 68 percent of GM’s U.S. unionized employees were represented by the 
UAW at the time of the filing of the Chapter 11 cases. See Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, 
¶ 23. 
 111. See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 112. The Chapter 11 cases of The Delphi Corporation (Delphi) are an example of the typical 
length of negotiations over contract modifications:   
Soon after the commencement of the chapter 11 cases, Delphi obtained a scheduling 
order setting forth certain requirements of Delphi and its unions [(including the UAW)] 
that included the submission of written proposals by Delphi to its unions setting forth 
proposed modifications deemed necessary by Delphi to enable its reorganization. It set 
a two-month deadline for Delphi to file section 1113 rejection motions if the parties 
were unable to achieve a consensual agreement. The parties extended the deadline twice 
while they engaged in negotiations as required by section 1113(b)(1). . . . The unions 
regularly stated that their members would strike if Delphi obtained court authorization 
to reject their respective [collective bargaining agreements] and attempted to impose 
modifications to wage rates, work rules, and benefits. . . . After months of negotiations, 
Delphi and the [UAW] agreed on an incentive program that would encourage eligible 
workers to retire early in exchange for lump sum payments, substantially subsidized by 
GM, thereby reducing the ongoing labor force. In an effort to resolve remaining issues, 
Delphi filed its section 1113 rejection motion. . . . In the face of persistent and caustic 
comments by union leaders that their membership would strike if Delphi attempted to 
impose modifications of the [collective bargaining agreement] postrejection, Delphi 
indefinitely adjourned the prosecution of the rejection motions. Negotiations resumed 
with the unions with GM’s participation. Almost one year later, Delphi and the UAW, 
the principal representative of Delphi’s organized employees, agreed to amendments of 
its [collective bargaining agreement]. 
Harvey R. Miller et al., The State of the Unions in Reorganization and Restructuring Cases, 15 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 465, 493–94 (2007). 
126 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
Plants needed to be closed. The UAW and its members would need to share 
in the sacrifice. 
While some critics may argue that the UAW got a “sweetheart” deal, 
the UAW did make significant concessions, including, among other things, 
reductions in overtime pay, bonuses, and benefits.113 The UAW also created 
greater competitive flexibility for GM to increase and decrease production 
capacity as necessary by permitting temporary flex employees, suspending 
the job security program, and creating new special attrition plans to reduce 
head count.114 A number of retiree benefits were also reduced or 
eliminated.115 In light of the aforementioned legal constraints and the 
required timing of the transaction, any suggestion that the deal for the UAW 
was too rich should be leveled at the UAW and not the U.S. government 
that was operating within the confines of the applicable law. 
C. A NEED FOR SPEED? 
[A] lengthy chapter 11 case for the Debtors is not an option. . . . In fact, the 
notion that a reorganization with a plan confirmation could be completed in 90 
days in a case of this size and complexity is ludicrous . . . 
Hon. Robert E. Gerber116 
Another concern raised about the GM bankruptcy process was the hasty 
nature of the 363 Transaction, which potentially sacrificed creditors’ rights 
in the process. The critics would argue that a transaction of this magnitude 
should only be conducted under a plan of reorganization where creditors 
have the right to challenge the impact of the proposed transaction on the 
treatment of their individual claims. 
Several factors, including the lack of additional financing and the 
concern over erosion in value, however, dictated the timing of the 
transaction. In fact, such timing is in line with other emergency sales under 
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.117 Had any credible party expressed an 
interest in funding an alternative transaction, the Bankruptcy Court may 
have put the brakes on, if at all possible. It is worth noting that just thirty 
days prior to the GM Chapter 11 case, Chrysler, one of the other “Big 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Declaration of David Curson, Ex. A, at 2, 8–9 (ECF No. 2518) (UAW General Motors – 
Modifications to 2007 Agreement and Addendum to VEBA Agreement). 
 114. Id. at 2, 3, 8. 
 115. Id. at 11–14. 
 116. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 485. 
 117. See, e.g., In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 407 B.R. 77, 80, 82, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(affirming bankruptcy court’s approval of sale of debtors’ investment banking business three days 
after the filing of sale motion); see also In re Stone Barn Manhattan LLC, 405 B.R. 68, 71–72 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving sale of debtors’ entire retail business forty-four days after 
filing); In re Refco, Inc., 354 B.R. 515, 517 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (approving sale of regulated 
commodities futures merchant bank twenty-eight days after commencement of bankruptcy case). 
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Three,” had undergone substantially the same process—a sale of all 
operating assets under a very tight deadline.118 
1. The Bankruptcy Sales Process 
A debtor may sell substantially all of its assets pursuant to § 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code or through a Chapter 11 plan. A Chapter 11 plan, 
however, requires substantially more time to approve and implement. 
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to sell assets 
outside the ordinary course of business upon notice and a hearing. While 
the plain language of § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code appears to provide a 
debtor with the unfettered right to dispose of any or all of its assets, courts 
have required that the decision to sell assets outside the ordinary course of 
business be based on the debtor’s “reasonable business judgment.”119 Such 
sales can be of individual items or substantially all of a debtor’s assets. 
Although for the latter to be permitted, there must be an articulated reason 
not to conduct the sale through a plan, such as in the case where the assets 
are perishable or constitute “melting ice cubes.”120 To demonstrate sound 
business judgment, courts typically require a debtor to market the asset to 
obtain the highest and best offer to maximize the proceeds from the sale for 
the benefit of creditors and all parties in interest. 
A sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets can be subject to attack on 
the basis that it constitutes an impermissible sub rosa plan. The term sub 
rosa is generally used in this context to describe a post-petition, pre-
                                                                                                                 
 118. In re Chrysler LLC (Chrysler I), 405 B.R. 84, 92–93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 2009 
U.S. App. LEXIS 12351 (2d Cir. June 5, 2009) (summary order) and 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(supplementary opinion), vacated as moot, Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC 
(Chrysler II), 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009). Although the judgment recorded at Chrysler I has 
been vacated, the Court’s rationale in Chrysler I remains persuasive and should arguably be given 
stare decisis effect. See, for example, Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Davis v. Cty. of Los 
Angeles: 
Although a decision vacating a judgment necessarily prevents the opinion of the lower 
court from being the law of the case, the expressions of the court below on the merits, if 
not reversed, will continue to have precedential weight and, until contrary authority is 
decided, are likely to be viewed as persuasive authority if not the governing law of 
[that] Circuit. 
440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 119. See generally Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722 F.2d 
1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that “there must be some articulated business justification, 
other than appeasement of major creditors, for using, selling or leasing property out of the 
ordinary course of business”); Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that in the Second Circuit, a 
363(b) sale is permissible if the judge finds that there is sufficient evidence that there is a good 
business reason for the sale); Stephens Indus., Inc. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding the bankruptcy court’s decision that an “articulated business reason justified the sale” 
of the debtor’s radio station); In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R. 169, 175–76 (D. Del. 1991) 
(noting that the courts in the Third Circuit have adopted the sound business purpose test). 
 120. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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confirmation transaction outside the ordinary course of business which 
allocates value to specific creditors, a process that is more appropriately 
implemented pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan.121 A sale of substantially all of 
a debtor’s assets under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is permitted where 
the assets are perishable, provided that the debtor is free to allocate sale 
proceeds as it sees fit under a subsequently filed Chapter 11 plan. 
Nevertheless, although pursuant to § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code a 
purchaser is free to assume whatever liabilities it chooses, it cannot 
designate how different creditors or equity holders will be treated in a 
debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.122 
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re 
Braniff Airways, Inc.), a proposed sale contemplated certain agreements 
between Braniff, the debtor, and a group consisting of certain unsecured 
and secured creditors of Braniff, and the transfer of certain assets to Pacific 
Southwest Airlines (PSA), in exchange for travel vouchers, unsecured 
notes, and a profit participation in PSA’s proposed operation of the assets 
(the PSA Agreement). Both the bankruptcy court and the district court had 
approved the transaction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
transaction was beyond the scope permitted by § 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and had established the terms of a plan of reorganization sub rosa. 
The Braniff court was most troubled by a provision within the PSA 
Agreement requiring that the travel vouchers be used only in a future 
Braniff reorganization, and be issued only to former Braniff employees, 
shareholders, or unsecured creditors. According to the Braniff court, the 
PSA Agreement not only changed the composition of Braniff’s assets, but 
had the practical effect of dictating the terms of any future reorganization 
plan by requiring allocation of the vouchers according to the PSA 
Agreement, at the risk of forfeiting a valuable asset.123 The Braniff court 
was also troubled by a provision in the PSA Agreement requiring “secured 
creditors to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of any future 
reorganization plan approved by a majority of the unsecured creditor’s 
committee [and a provision providing] for the release of claims by all 
parties against Braniff, its secured creditors, and its officers and 
directors.”124 In essence, the sale proposed in Braniff would have: (1) 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Craig A. Sloane, Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor 
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 37–38 (1999). 
 122. Chrysler I, 576 F.3d at 126 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale over 
objections that a sale free and clear of any interests should not include successor liability claims 
explaining that the “possibility of transferring assets free and clear of existing tort liability was a 
critical inducement to the [s]ale”); see also Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. 
(In re Smart World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 169 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Section 363 permits 
sales of assets free and clear of claims and interests. It thus allows purchasers . . . to acquire assets 
without any accompanying liabilities.”). 
 123. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939–40. 
 124. Id.  
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controlled distributions in a future plan of reorganization; (2) obligated 
secured creditors to vote for such plan; and (3) released claims of all parties 
against the debtors, its officers and directors, and the secured creditors. The 
Braniff court held that when a proposed sale transaction dictates specific 
terms of an ensuing reorganization plan, “the parties . . . must scale the 
hurdles erected in Chapter 11.”125 The Braniff court concluded that, were 
the transaction approved, little would remain for further reorganization: 
“These considerations reinforce our view that this is in fact a 
reorganization,” and not a mere asset sale within the confines of § 363(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code.126 
The tension between the broad authority granted to a debtor in § 363(b), 
and the rigorous solicitation and approval process of a Chapter 11 plan, has 
been a source of significant debate, most vociferously when the sale 
involves substantially all of a debtor’s assets. Most courts to consider the 
issue have concluded that a debtor may dispose of substantially all of its 
assets pursuant to § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code when circumstances 
dictate an expeditious transaction.127 Courts typically apply stricter scrutiny 
to a sale of substantially all of a debtor’s assets because this type of 
transaction may provide an attractive opportunity to circumvent the 
protections that the Bankruptcy Code provides for reorganizations.128 
2. Expediency of the 363 Transaction 
As GM’s largest secured creditor, the U.S. government129 dedicated 
substantial time and effort to negotiating with the debtors to preserve the 
going-concern value of the GM enterprise. Surveys taken prior to the GM 
bankruptcy showed that consumers needed to have confidence in GM’s 
products (i.e., that a GM would exist in the future that would stand behind 
its products).130 Both GM and the U.S. Treasury were well aware that 
consumers would hesitate when purchasing cars and trucks from a bankrupt 
company, and that the longer GM was in bankruptcy, the more significant 
the potential for erosion of the value of its assets. GM’s assets were fragile 
and a quick § 363(b) sale was not only warranted, but necessary to preserve 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 940 (“See e.g.[,] 11 U.S.C. § 1125 [(2006)] (disclosure requirements); id. § 1126 
(voting); id. § 1129(a)(7) (best interests of creditors test); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (absolute priority 
rule).”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291 B.R. 39, 43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Where a debtor attempts to sell substantially all of its assets pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 363(b), instead of waiting for confirmation of a reorganization plan and the safeguards 
that that process provides, more than cursory scrutiny is required by the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt.”). 
 128. See In re New Hampshire Elec. Coop., Inc., 131 B.R. 249, 252 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) 
(“[T]he closer the transaction gets to the heart of the reorganization process, the more scrutiny the 
[c]ourt has to give that matter.”). 
 129. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 130. Viability Plan II, supra note 33, at 36, 103, 112–17. 
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the going-concern value of GM. In fact, the linchpin for the sale hearing 
before the Bankruptcy Court was the uncontroverted testimony that any 
delay in the § 363 sale would result in continuing and increasing revenue 
erosion and further loss of market share to other domestic and foreign 
manufacturers that were not suffering aggravated financial distress.131 
After a three-day hearing, with more than 850 objections having been 
filed and addressed, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to New GM on 
July 5, 2009. The Bankruptcy Court found that absent an immediate sale, it 
was highly probable that GM would have to liquidate.132 There were no 
other realistic alternatives available. There were no merger partners, 
acquirers, or investors willing and able to purchase GM’s business. Other 
than the U.S. Treasury and the Canadian EDC, there were no lenders 
willing and able to finance the debtor’s continued operations. The 
Bankruptcy Court further found that no debtor-in-possession financing was 
available in the absence of the 363 Transaction.133 No entity—other than the 
U.S. Treasury—had the wherewithal or the inclination to provide such 
financing.134 
The sub rosa argument had been articulated by several creditors, 
principally bondholders. In the end, GM was able to establish that the sale 
transaction did not dictate the terms of a plan of reorganization and that the 
estate’s portion of the sale consideration was unencumbered from any 
contractual condition or requirement. The Bankruptcy Court observed:  
[A] debtor cannot enter into a transaction that would amount to a sub rosa 
plan of reorganization or an attempt to circumvent the chapter 11 
requirements for confirmation of a plan of reorganization. If, however, the 
transaction has a proper business justification which has the potential to 
                                                                                                                 
 131. The Court noted:  
Observers might differ as to the causes or opine that there were others as well, and 
might differ especially with respect to which causes were most important. But what is 
clear is that, especially in 2008 and 2009, GM suffered a steep erosion in revenues, 
significant operating losses, and a dramatic loss of liquidity, putting its future in grave 
jeopardy. 
In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 132. The Court stated: 
As nobody can seriously dispute, the only alternative to an immediate sale is 
liquidation—a disastrous result for GM’s creditors, its employees, the suppliers who 
depend on GM for their own existence, and the communities in which GM operates. In 
the event of a liquidation, creditors now trying to increase their incremental recoveries 
would get nothing. 
Id. at 474. 
 133. See id. at 491–92 (“If the 363 Transaction [was] disapproved, GM [would have lost] its 
funding and its liquidity . . . and its only alternative [would have been] liquidation.”). 
 134. Id. at 480. 
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lead toward confirmation of a plan and is not to evade the plan 
confirmation process, the transaction may be authorized.135  
As to the contention that the 363 Transaction was a sub rosa plan because 
the Purchaser was allowed to “cherry-pick” certain liabilities for 
assumption, and failed to provide consideration to all of GM’s stakeholders, 
the court noted that “that does not rise to the level of establishing a sub rosa 
plan. The objectors’ real problem is with the decisions of the [p]urchaser, 
not with the [d]ebtor[s], nor with any violation of the [Bankruptcy] Code or 
caselaw.”136 
The Bankruptcy Court was not persuaded by arguments that the sale of 
substantially all of the debtor’s assets could only be achieved under a 
Chapter 11 plan. The Bankruptcy Court noted that § 363(b)  
does not provide, in words or substance, that it may not be used in chapter 
11 cases for dispositions of property exceeding any particular size, or 
where the property is of such importance that it should alternatively be 
disposed of under a plan. Nor does any other provision of the 
[Bankruptcy] Code so provide.137 
D. TRANSPARENCY IN THE PROCESS 
An underappreciated aspect of the GM Chapter 11 cases is the stark 
transparency of the entire process. All aspects of GM’s Chapter 11 cases, 
including the 363 Transaction, were subject to notice and an opportunity to 
be heard by a neutral third-party tribunal (i.e., the Bankruptcy Court). As 
with many other time sensitive matters in the Bankruptcy Court, so was 
substantial discovery on an expedited basis (both document production and 
depositions) made available to opponents of the 363 Transaction.138 The 
bankruptcy process also provided opposing parties a means to appeal if they 
believed that the Bankruptcy Court erred. Several appeals of the order 
approving the 363 Transaction were in fact brought.139 The entire process 
was a matter of public record and was subject to public review. 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 496. 
 137. Id. at 486. 
 138. See Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65, 73–74 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 10-4882-bk, doc. 90 (2d Cir. July 28, 2011), cert. 
denied, 2012 WL 33339 (Jan. 9, 2011) (affirming the 363 Transaction over objection of a 
purported GM bondholder and rejecting appellant’s argument that the speed of the 363 
Transaction violated his due process rights because the record showed that over a period of ten 
days, GM provided full and prompt discovery to every party that requested it, including 
appellant). 
 139. Appeals were filed by various parties including one of GM’s labor unions, the IUE-CWA, 
an ad hoc committee of asbestos claimants, a group of product liability tort claimants, and certain 
pro se bondholders. See, e.g., Notice of Appeal of Order Authorizing the Sale of Assets Pursuant 
to the Master Sale and Purchase Agreement with Vehicle Acquisition Holdings LLC (ECF No. 
2988); Joinder of Mark Buttita, as Personal Representative of Salvatore Buttita, to the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants’ Motion for an Order Certifying Sale Order for 
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Although some might criticize the expedited nature of the 363 
Transaction, opposing parties still voiced their opposition in a meaningful 
manner, and the Bankruptcy Court held hearings over three days to consider 
such opposition. Parties filed over 850 objections and responses to the 363 
Transaction that are now part of the public record of the cases. The 
transcript for the hearing to approve the 363 Transaction is over 1,200 
pages. Most importantly, nothing prohibited any party from proposing an 
alternative to the 363 Transaction or the financing provided by the U.S. 
Treasury and Canadian EDC, on which the 363 Transaction was 
predicated.140 Had an alternative been proposed, GM would have had a 
fiduciary obligation to consider such proposal; and, if such proposal 
provided a more meaningful recovery to creditors, GM would likely have 
been obligated to pursue such proposal if it were possible. 
The Bankruptcy Code also provides a predetermined framework for 
creditors’ rights. This framework, including priority schemes for allocation 
of value to creditors and equity holders, is a critical element of 
transparency. Transparency is illusory if there is no predictability and 
parties cannot assess whether the transaction is fundamentally fair and 
consistent with traditional norms. 
Some critics have suggested that certain creditors, such as products 
liability tort victims, should receive preferential treatment because of the 
disproportional “pain” suffered by such creditors.141 The argument is that, 
unlike bondholders, tort claimants did not extend credit to GM and did not 
voluntarily agree that they could be injured. Since the Bankruptcy Code 
makes clear that no such priority exists in the Chapter 11 context, counsel 
for claimants have been accepting of the treatment afforded to their clients. 
Through the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has already determined which 
creditors are entitled to priority and in the absence of congressional 
amendment to the Code, parties have an expectation of where they must 
stand. 
If the U.S. government were to nationalize GM and devise a 
restructuring or forced sale on its own without a pre-established distribution 
scheme such as those set out in the Bankruptcy Code, these types of 
arguments would stand on firmer ground. Moreover, a lack of transparency 
would engender creditor frustration. 
                                                                                                                 
Immediate Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(D)(2) or in 
the Alternative for a Stay of the Sale Order, Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8005 (ECF No. 3013); 
Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 3060); Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 3115); Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 
3265). 
 140. Wilson Declaration, supra note 36, ¶ 11; Henderson Affidavit, supra note 6, ¶ 14–15. 
 141. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 2. 
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III. IMPROVING THE PROCESS 
In retrospect, the GM bankruptcy appears to be an overwhelming 
success. GM has positioned itself again as a strong contender in the 
automotive sector. Hundreds of thousands of jobs were preserved and 
billions of dollars of enterprise value maintained. But a sale pursuant to      
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is not the answer for government 
intervention in all “too big to fail” restructurings. Every restructuring 
generates different considerations. In addition to sales pursuant to § 363, the 
Bankruptcy Code provides various other tools that may make Chapter 11 a 
viable alternative for future government assistance of systemically 
significant companies. 
To prepare for the next restructuring cycle, it may make sense for 
Congress to analyze lessons learned from the automotive restructurings to 
determine if reforms to the Bankruptcy Code are warranted or desirable. 
While the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (the Dodd-Frank Act)142 has provided an alternative means of 
addressing the insolvency of systemically important financial institutions, 
the lack of transparency and predictability of a government takeover under 
the Dodd-Frank Act is less than ideal. 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act provides a means for the U.S. 
government to provide bridge financing to a distressed company, it strips 
many of the safeguards and protections provided by the bankruptcy process. 
In the first instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
the U.S. Federal Reserve effectively have exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine how a financial institution will be liquidated or recapitalized. The 
FDIC and Federal Reserve also would have the unilateral ability to 
determine how value is monetized and how collateral of secured creditors is 
valued for purposes of distributions. There would be no judicial oversight 
or forum to address individual creditor disputes. While Chapter 11 is not a 
perfect solution, it provides the checks and balances that insulate the U.S. 
government from allegations that they have acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 
A. MAKING NATIONAL INTERESTS A FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION 
The Bankruptcy Code143 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure144 generally dictate the parties that have standing in a bankruptcy 
case. Entities that are neither creditors nor equity holders may be affected 
substantially by the outcome of a case, yet the bankruptcy court is not 
empowered to consider their interests. This typically makes perfect sense 
because the goals of Chapter 11 are to promote a fresh start for the debtor 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 143. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006). 
 144. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018, 7024. 
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and maximize value for creditors and equity holders. In the context of a 
debtor that is deemed “too big to fail,” however, the national interest may 
be paramount to creditor recoveries. 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code could be considered to provide 
the U.S. government with standing to promote the national interest in 
appropriate and limited circumstances. The bankruptcy court could likewise 
be empowered to consider the national interest in approving or 
disapproving of transactions out of the ordinary course of business. 
This would permit the bankruptcy court to consider matters beyond the 
scope of the interest of creditors. For example, assume two alternative 
transactions were pending before the bankruptcy court. Transaction A 
would provide for recoveries to creditors of approximately fifty cents on the 
dollar but would require the immediate shutdown of certain operations 
critical to the economy as a whole. On the other hand, Transaction B would 
provide recoveries of approximately forty-five cents on the dollar but would 
provide a more orderly wind-down of certain operations that would 
minimize the overall impact of the transaction. Under the current 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor would be duty bound to select Transaction A 
over Transaction B even though the impact on the country could be 
catastrophic. What constitutes the “public good” may be subject to much 
debate, but should not the court at least have an opportunity to consider it? 
Such a public interest standard is not without precedent. For example, 
§ 1165 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs railroad reorganizations, 
provides that in applying the provisions governing railroad reorganizations, 
the court and the trustee “shall consider the public interest in addition to the 
interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders.”145 A similar 
provision could be enacted for systemically important institutions. 
Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code currently provides that “a 
party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an 
equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or 
any indenture trustee, may raise or may appear to be heard on any issue in a 
case under this chapter.”146 In recognition of the “public interest,” § 1109 of 
the Bankruptcy Code could be amended to grant an appropriate regulatory 
agency standing to participate in the Chapter 11 case of a systemically 
important institution. These amendments could go so far as to divest a 
Chapter 11 debtor of its exclusive rights to control its Chapter 11 case and 
the plan process by allowing a regulatory agency, such as the FDIC, to seek 
the appointment of a receiver within the Chapter 11 cases or to seek leave 
of the bankruptcy court to terminate exclusivity and propose its own 
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Chapter 11 plan that otherwise complies with the requirements of § 1129 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.147 
B. REVIEW OF PRIORITIES SCHEME 
Though Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide priority 
treatment to additional creditor constituencies, each exception to the equal 
sharing of pain among similarly situated creditors undermines the 
overarching purpose of the bankruptcy process to permit a company to 
rehabilitate, reorganize, and recover while providing for an equitable 
distribution of value. The Bankruptcy Code is already replete with special 
interest exceptions which hamper a company’s ability to reorganize.148 
The plight of product liability victims in the GM case, for example, is 
not an indication of a need to alter the priority scheme for such claims. The 
root of the issue was the lack of third-party insurance except for the largest 
of claims. The problem would be better solved by monitoring the health of 
companies self-insuring risk rather than by altering the priority scheme for 
certain claimants. In any event, these issues are worthy of debate so long as 
the loudest voices are not controlled by special interest groups. 
CONCLUSION 
The restructuring of GM was historic not only in the importance of the 
rescue to the stabilization of the U.S. economy but also for the U.S. 
government’s innovative use of the Bankruptcy Code to implement an 
emergency sale of the operating assets while leaving behind the non-core 
assets and most liabilities. As with any government action, there were 
supporters and detractors. Some critics have argued that certain creditor 
constituencies did not receive sufficient recoveries, yet additional 
recoveries would have resulted in greater expenditures of taxpayer dollars. 
Others, of course, have criticized the use of taxpayer dollars in the first 
instance; yet liquidation would have eliminated the possibility that 
unsecured creditors would receive any distributions, multiplying the pain 
felt by individual creditors and having an even worse effect on the national 
budget. Liquidation could have exacted an even greater toll on taxpayers 
through the result of lost jobs, decreased tax revenues, and increased 
expenditures on unemployment assistance, healthcare, and environmental 
remediation. 
Overall, the process worked. Had the U.S. Treasury attempted to 
implement a restructuring without the transparency of bankruptcy court 
oversight, the public outcry would have been thunderous. The likely 
outcome would have been that the U.S. Treasury would have had expended 
multiples of what it ultimately did in an effort to keep GM afloat and allow 
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the company to honor all of its obligations. Alternatively, the U.S. Treasury 
would have had to engineer some form of nationalization by fiat where the 
form of consideration ultimately paid to creditors certainly would be 
challenged as arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
In response to the last financial crisis, the U.S. government has spent 
significant resources developing procedures for winding down systemically 
significant financial institutions while minimizing the impact on the global 
economy. Winding down a company like GM, however, is not a realistic 
option. Given the success of the 363 Transaction, Congress should evaluate 
whether modifications to the Bankruptcy Code are appropriate to ensure 
that in future financial crises, the United States could effectively utilize the 
Bankruptcy Code to rescue systemically significant companies with 
nowhere else to turn. 
